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Abstract—Modern cloud services have complex architectures, often comprising many software components, and depend on hundreds
of configurations parameters to function correctly, securely, and with high performance. Due to the prevalence of open-source software,
developers can easily deploy services using third-party software without mastering the configurations of that software. As a result,
configuration errors (i.e., misconfigurations) are among the leading causes of service disruptions and outages. While existing cloud
automation tools ease the process of service deployment and management, support for detecting misconfigurations in the cloud has
not been addressed thoroughly, likely due to the lack of frameworks suitable for consistent parsing of unstandardized configuration files.
This paper introduces ConfEx, a framework that enables discovery and extraction of text-based software configurations in the cloud.
ConfEx uses a novel vocabulary-based technique to identify configuration files in cloud system instances with unlabeled content. To
extract the information in these files, ConfEx leverages existing configuration parsers and post-processes the extracted data for
analysis. We show that ConfEx achieves over 99% precision and 100% recall in identifying configuration files on 7805 popular Docker
Hub images. Using two applied examples, we demonstrate that ConfEx also enables detecting misconfigurations in the cloud via
existing tools that are designed for configurations represented as key-value pairs, revealing 184 errors in public Docker Hub images.
Index Terms—Software configuration, cloud, misconfiguration diagnosis.
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1 INTRODUCTION
C LOUD applications are designed in a highly config-urable way to ensure high levels of reusability and
portability. To function correctly, securely, and with high
performance, these applications often depend on precise
tuning of hundreds of configuration parameters [1]. The
number of parameters to tune can reach thousands in typical
cloud services that consist of multi-tiered software stacks [2].
While configurations are traditionally validated by ap-
plications during startup, recent work has shown that,
across various software applications in today’s cloud, 14-
93% of configuration parameters do not have any special
code for checking their correctness [3]. Moreover, the af-
fordability offered by the cloud and the prevalence of open-
source software have enabled new levels of agility, where
small teams of developers can deliver new cloud services
and functionality in short periods of time. This newfound
agility has led to a trend where service developers and
operators leverage third-party software and public cloud
images without necessarily having the expertise needed to
precisely configure all components of their service. This,
combined with the often-immature documentation that ac-
companies newly-introduced software, makes human error
the leading cause of configuration-related failures [4]. In
a similar vein, configuration errors have taken their place
among the leading causes of cloud software failures [5], [6],
[7], and have been reported as causes of service disruptions
at Microsoft Azure [8], Amazon EC2 [9], and Google [10].
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Existing failure avoidance and mitigation mechanisms in
the cloud (e.g., redundancy or recovery) are insufficient to
handle configuration errors, as configurations tend to affect
the entire cloud service rather than a single component
such as a VM or a process [5], [11]. Widely-used cloud
deployment tools such as Chef [12] and Ansible [13] provide
centralized management support for configurations. These
tools manage the configuration parameters that are related
to deployment and scaling but do not typically validate the
parameters that determine functionality and performance.
Hence, there is a growing need for support to help analyze
and validate software configurations in cloud platforms.
There are several challenges in applying automated con-
figuration analysis in the cloud. First, users often do not
store their configurations in standard file system locations
in cloud instances (i.e., images, VMs, and containers). Es-
pecially in multi-tenant cloud platforms, where there is
no platform-wide configuration management mechanism,
one needs to discover the locations of configurations in
a cloud instance to perform analysis. Second, configura-
tion parameters of cloud software are often embedded in
human-readable text files, where each software has its own
custom file syntax. For automated analysis, the information
extracted from these files needs to be represented in a
consistent format that allows validation and comparison of
individual parameters. Third, cloud instances typically con-
tain multiple configuration files that are tuned for different
use cases or software versions. As some of these files are not
actively used by the running applications, one needs to de-
termine which configurations are active in a cloud instance
to avoid false positives while detecting configuration errors.
Finally, as many configuration parameters are related to
the execution environment [14], environmental information
such as file access permissions should be collected from
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2cloud instances. To address the above challenges, one needs
a framework to discover and extract consistent configuration
information from cloud instances with unlabeled content.
In this paper, we introduce ConfEx, a novel software
configuration analytics framework that enables robust anal-
ysis of text-based software configurations in the cloud.
ConfEx collects environmental information from the cloud
instances, discovers configuration files of known applica-
tions in these systems, and parses the discovered files to
produce consistent configuration data. By itself, ConfEx does
not perform any validation on the configuration data it
extracts. Instead, it enables the use of existing validation
tools originally designed for key-value-based configurations
(such as PeerPressure [15] and Encore [14]) on extracted
configuration data. As we demonstrate in our evaluation,
without ConfEx, these tools have limited applicability in the
cloud. Our specific contributions are as follows:
• We propose ConfEx, a configuration analytics frame-
work that enables the analysis of text-based software
configurations in multi-tenant cloud platforms and
image repositories. We provide two examples of Con-
fEx being applied to existing configuration analysis
tools to detect misconfigurations.
• As part of ConfEx, we develop a method to dis-
cover the configuration files in cloud instances with
unlabeled content. By identifying configuration key-
words (such as parameter names) in an application-
agnostic manner, our method achieves over 99% pre-
cision and 100% recall on identifying configuration
files in 7805 Docker Hub images.
• To enable focusing on configuration files that are
actively used by running applications, we develop
two methods: Our first method targets VMs and
utilizes Linux file timestamps; our second method
tracks system calls during application initialization
and targets containers.
• We demonstrate that the outputs of existing configu-
ration parsers often lack the consistency and robust-
ness for configuration analysis. To resolve this issue,
we design a disambiguation methodology, enabling
comparison and analysis of configurations among
thousands of cloud instances.
2 BACKGROUND ON CLOUD SOFTWARE CONFIG-
URATIONS
Most cloud applications and system services store their con-
figurations in human-readable text files or in configuration
stores such as etcd or Windows registry. We focus on text
file based configurations as this type of storage is prevalent
for many of the building blocks of cloud applications (e.g.,
MySQL, Nginx, and Redis). The remainder of this section
explains cloud software configurations in detail and dis-
cusses how to use analytics to detect configuration errors.
2.1 Text-based Configurations
Figure 1 shows a snippet from an Apache HTTP server
(httpd) configuration file. Each of the first two lines contains
a parameter followed by a value, separated by a space. Lines
3-6 are in an application-specific format representing a con-
ditional statement. User and Group parameters are defined
1 ServerRoot "/var/www"
2 Listen 80
3 <IfModule unixd_module>
4 User daemon
5 Group daemon
6 </IfModule>
parameter value
application-specific
conditional statement
Fig. 1. Httpd configuration file snippet. Configurations are stored in an
XML-like format.
1 proc swap swap pri=42 0 0
2 tmpfs /dev/shm tmpfs mode=0777 0 0
3 devpts /dev/pts devpts defaults,gid=5 0 0
Fig. 2. /etc/fstab snippet. Configurations are stored in a table format
where certain table cells contain multiple configuration entries.
within the IfModule unixd_module section, represent-
ing a configuration hierarchy.
In some configuration files, understanding the file
schema requires domain knowledge. One such example
is the Linux filesystem configuration file (/etc/fstab).
As shown in Figure 2, this file is structured in a table
format where some columns may include parameter-value
pairs such as pri=42 (line 1) or multiple comma-separated
entries such as defaults,gid=5 (line 3).
Extracting configuration data from text-based files while
retaining the relational information between different en-
tries requires expertise on the specific file format. Hence,
to conduct corpus-based configuration analysis on a large
number of applications, one should use a parsing tool that
is continuously maintained by application domain experts.
2.2 Configuration File Locations
Software package managers such as rpm place config-
uration files to specific file system paths by default.
For example, the configurations of MySQL are installed
by default to /etc/my.cnf, /etc/mysql/my.cnf, and
/etc/mysql/conf.d/.
In cloud platforms, however, users often store their con-
figurations in non-standard locations. By examining popular
Docker Hub images as an example, we have discovered
that depending on the application, 20-81% of configura-
tion files are located in non-standard paths (see Sec. 4.2
for details). For example, we have identified MySQL con-
figuration files located in /app/my.cnf, /my-mini.cnf,
/healthcheck.cnf, and /usr/cnf, where file names are
not necessarily indicative of MySQL. Hence, one needs a
systematic methodology to identify configuration files for
comprehensive configuration analysis in the cloud.
2.3 Active Configuration Files
Cloud instances often contain multiple syntactically-valid
configuration files for a given application. These files in-
clude (1) configurations of modules and plug-ins, which
enable new software functionalities, (2) configurations of
specific application instances (e.g., Nginx can use a sep-
arate configuration file for each virtual host), (3) template
files, which set the default application behavior and can be
directly used, and (4) multiple versions of configuration files
that are used for testing and development purposes.
3TABLE 1
Common configuration error types and example constraints that lead to
errors upon violation.
Error type Example configuration constraint
Illegal entries
In PostgreSQL, parameter values that are not simple
identifiers or numbers must be single-quoted.
Variables must be in certain types (e.g., float).
Inconsistent
entries
In PHP, mysql.max_persistent must be no
larger than the max_connections in MySQL.
In Cloudshare, service’s redis.host entry
(an IP address) must be a substring of Nginx’s
upstream.msg.server entry (IP address:port).
Invalid
ordering
When using PHP in Apache, recode.so must
be defined before mysql.so.
Environmental
inconsistency
In MySQL, maximum allowed table size must be
smaller than the memory available in the system
In httpd, Apache user permissions must be set
correctly to enable file uploads for website visitors.
Missing
parameter
In OpenLDAP, a configuration entry must include
ppolicy.schema to enable password policy.
Valid entries
that cause
performance
or security
issues
MySQL’s Autocommit parameter must be set to
False to avoid poor performance under “insert”
intensive workloads.
Debug-level logging must be disabled to avoid
performance degradation.
At the time of deployment, an application will use only
a specific set of configuration files, which we refer to as
active configuration files. These files are determined based
on command line options or the main configuration file. The
remaining passive files typically do not affect the application
behavior. Detecting misconfigurations in these passive files
would be of little use to cloud users and may be even seen as
false positives. Hence, it is necessary to identify which files
are actively used in a running cloud instance for accurate
error detection.
2.4 Configuration Errors
Table 1 summarizes common misconfiguration types we
derived from related work (e.g., [2], [7], [14], [16], [17])
and online technical forums (e.g., stackoverflow.com). Illegal
entries can be identified through syntactic validation. Detect-
ing inconsistent entries and invalid ordering requires extracting
dependency and correlation information among various
parameters. Environmental inconsistencies occur when appli-
cation configurations do not match the environmental pa-
rameters such as file permissions and IP addresses. To find
such inconsistencies, one needs to collect and analyze both
application and environment configurations. Detecting miss-
ing parameters requires checking the existence of parameters
rather than focusing on the values assigned to parameters.
Valid entries that cause performance degradation or security
vulnerabilities do not lead to crashes or error messages.
2.5 Configuration Analysis
Researchers have developed various tools to automatically
check for errors in software configurations (e.g., [18], [19]).
Unlike the configurations found in cloud instances, these
tools are mainly geared towards configurations that are
represented as key-value pairs, where each key consistently
corresponds to a specific configuration parameter.
Among automated configuration validation tools, sta-
tistical and learning-based techniques (e.g., [15], [20], [21])
have gained popularity as low overhead configuration
checkers that can be applied in an application-agnostic
manner. These techniques use a corpus of configurations
collected from working systems to infer configuration con-
straints or learn common patterns. Then, configurations that
violate the inferred constraints or deviate from the norm are
identified as potential errors. Such methods are appealing
in practice because they do not require intrusive dynamic
analysis or application instrumentation.
Cloud environments, where a large number of users
deploy their customized applications, provide a unique
opportunity for statistical and learning-based configuration
analysis. However, training models for such techniques and
using these models to validate configurations requires dis-
covery of configurations and extraction of configuration pa-
rameters across large populations of installed applications.
2.6 Potential Uses for a Cloud Configuration Analytics
Framework
As mentioned in the introduction, the cloud’s meteoric rise
has enabled new highs in developer productivity. Automa-
tion, in terms of both cloud operators automating their
infrastructure and cloud users automating their application
deployments, has been a key driver of this rise [22], [23].
However, a consistent method for automating cloud config-
uration analysis and validation has not yet been realized,
and unless the right application-specific configuration val-
idation tool happens to exist, service reliability engineers
are often forced to manually review every revision of each
application configuration that they manage.
A cloud-focused configuration analysis framework
could lay the groundwork for a solution to this problem.
With the permission of cloud users, cloud operators could
collect user configurations in VMs and containers to create
a large and highly-diverse configuration dataset and to
train accurate configuration models. These models could
then be used to identify problematic configurations before
deployment, saving cloud users days of engineering time
that would otherwise be spent on configuration debugging.
3 CONFIGURATION ANALYTICS WITH CONFEX
Our goal is to systematically analyze text-based software
configurations in image repositories and multi-tenant cloud
platforms, where cloud instances are calibrated by different
users and include unlabeled content. To this end, we design
a configuration analytics framework, ConfEx.
Figure 3 shows the overview of our ConfEx framework.
ConfEx has three phases: discovery, extraction, and analysis.
In the discovery phase, we identify the actively used con-
figuration files and collect environmental data from target
systems. The extraction phase then parses the information
in the configuration files, and transforms the collected data
into key-value pairs where each key corresponds to a single
configuration parameter. Finally, in the analysis phase, we
use existing tools based on outlier detection and rule-based
validation to analyze the extracted configuration data. The
rest of this section explains these three phases in detail.
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Fig. 3. ConfEx overview. The discovery phase collects environmental
data and identifies actively used configuration files. The extraction phase
parses the information in the identified files and generates configuration
data that is consistent across cloud instances. The analysis phase ap-
plies existing rule-based, statistical, or learning-based tools to analyze
and validate the configurations.
3.1 Discovery
Discovery focuses on (1) identifying configuration files that
are actively used in the target system and (2) collecting envi-
ronmental data (such as user privileges and file permissions)
that can be used to detect misconfigurations.
3.1.1 Active File Discovery
As discussed in Sec. 2.3, only a specific set of configuration
files are used in a running cloud instance. Including the
remaining unused files in configuration analysis can lead to
unreliable results, and misconfigurations detected in these
unused files may be seen as false positives by cloud users.
Hence, ConfEx focuses only on the files that are accessed by
applications in VMs and containers.
We have developed two solutions to determine the
files that are accessed: (1) checking file timestamps, and
(2) tracking system calls during application initialization.
Our solutions, as described below, differ in their degree of
applicability and intrusiveness.
Checking file timestamps: One way to understand
whether a file has been accessed is to check its Unix access
timestamp, atime. In most file systems, atime is updated
by default when the file is read for the first time after being
modified or if the existing atime is older than one day.
Hence, during discovery, we check atime’s and ignore the
files that have not been accessed since a specific time point,
which is the last system restart time by default and can be
overriden by the user. We use atime for active file discovery
in VMs; however, this approach is not applicable if atime is
disabled through file system mount options or in copy-on-
write file systems such as shared Docker layers or btrfs [24].
Tracking system calls: In systems where the atime-
based approach is inapplicable, we identify accessed files
by tracking open() system calls that have the read flag
using the auditd tool on the host machine. Note that
applications typically read their configurations during ini-
tialization; hence, we need to track system calls only during
application initialization. This approach is suitable for con-
tainers, which typically start with an entry script that runs
the application inside the container. In situations where the
application being analyzed is known to load configuration
files long after its initialization (e.g., a modular web server),
the user may configure ConfEx to continue monitoring
syscalls for a longer duration.
Both active file discovery solutions are only applicable to
cases where the target systems are actively running. In cases
where the target system or image must be analyzed offline,
active discovery can be skipped, and instead all available
files can be passed to the identification stage.
3.1.2 Configuration File Identification
The files identified by the active file discovery step include
binaries and data files along with configuration files. To
identify the configuration files among the accessed files, we
first discard non-text files. Second, to reduce computational
overhead, we discard the files with extensions that are used
for non-configuration files (such as .h or .md5sums) and
the files that are larger than an empirically-determined size
threshold (see Sec. 4 for details). To identify configuration
files among the remaining text files, ConfEx examines the
content of these files in the file labeling step in Fig. 3.
Figure 4 depicts ConfEx’s file labeling step in detail.
During offline training, we use known configuration files
that are labeled with application names. We then identify the
configuration keywords in these files to generate application-
specific vocabularies. Configuration keywords include pa-
rameter names and configuration commands, and are usu-
ally specific to applications. We extract these keywords in
an application-agnostic way as follows: We first discard
commented-out lines, i.e., lines that begin with //, #, or
%, excluding the preceding white-space characters. The first
words of non-comment lines in a configuration file typi-
cally correspond to parameter names or configuration com-
mands, whereas the subsequent words are user-provided
values such as integers and file paths. Hence, we use the first
word of the remaining lines as keywords. While extracting
keywords, we use the following characters as delimiters to
account for the characters that are commonly used as part of
a configuration file syntax: \t, =, , :, <, >, [, ], and ,. An
application vocabulary consists of sets of unique keywords
for each known configuration file.
During testing, we again extract the keyword set in the
input text file using the same methodology. We calculate
the similarity of the input keyword set to each keyword
set in the vocabulary of each application. To calculate the
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Fig. 4. File labeling step of the discovery phase. During offline training, a
vocabulary is generated for each application using known configuration
files. Input text files are compared with each application vocabulary.
Upon a match that is larger than a confidence threshold, syntactically
valid files are labeled as configuration files.
similarity of a set pair, we use the Jaccard index [25], defined
as J = |W1∩W2|/|W1∪W2|, whereW1 andW2 are two sets.
If the maximum achieved similarity using the keyword sets
in an application vocabulary is lower than an empirically-
determined threshold, Tconfidence, the file is discarded (see
Sec. 4.2 for details). Finally, we check the syntax of the files
with sufficient keyword set similarity, and label syntactically
valid files as application configuration file.
Note that calculating the Jaccard index between the input
keyword set, Wtest, and keyword sets for all known con-
figuration files is computationally expensive. Furthermore,
most non-configuration files do not contain any application-
specific keywords and need not to be compared with all
keyword sets in a vocabulary. Hence, we speed-up set
comparison as follows: Let a keyword set of a known
configuration file f beWf , and the union of all keywords in
a vocabulary beWvocab. Then, the Jaccard similarity (J ) has
the following upper bound:
J =
|Wtest ∩Wf |
|Wtest ∪Wf | ≤ Jupper =
|Wtest ∩Wvocab|
|Wtest| (1)
as Wf ⊆ Wvocab, and |Wtest ∪Wf | ≥ |Wtest|. Checking
Jupper once per vocabulary eliminates the need to com-
pare Wtest with all Wf ’s in the vocabulary if Jupper <
Tconfidence.
To add a new application or extend an application’s ex-
isting vocabulary, one can simply process new configuration
files that are labeled with application names without the
need of re-processing all known configuration files.
3.1.3 Collecting Environmental Data
As mentioned in Sec. 2.4, misconfigurations can occur due to
a mismatch between software configurations and environ-
mental settings such as IP addresses and file permissions.
Table 2 lists the environmental information ConfEx collects.
All the information we collect can be used for analysis on
VMs and containers; all except the network address and the
active port information can be used for analysis on images.
TABLE 2
Environmental information collected from cloud instances.
Description Source
User information /etc/passwd
Group information /etc/group
File metadata Crawling the file system
Environmental variables docker inspect or env
Network addresses docker inspect or ifconfig
Active ports docker inspect or netstat
3.2 Extraction
The extraction phase parses the configuration data located
in text files identified by the discovery phase, and generates
key-value pairs that represent configurations. Such key-
value pairs can be directly used by the existing configuration
analysis tools such as Encore [14] and ConfigV [21].
While existing studies on configuration analysis have
mostly focused on configuration stores that do not require
data extraction such as Windows Registry (e.g., [26]), or
configurations with standard file formats such as XML or
JSON (e.g., [19], [27]), most configuration files of cloud
applications are kept in human-readable text files that do
not use standard file formats. As discused in Sec. 2.1,
these files require custom parsing rules based on domain
knowledge. However, the variety and rapid evolution of
applications make it expensive and bug-prone to implement
and maintain custom parsers for different applications for
every configuration analysis tool.
3.2.1 Augeas for Parsing Configuration Files
To leverage the knowledge of domain experts on various
applications and re-use an existing code-base that is contin-
uously maintained, we build our extraction phase on top
of Augeas [28], which is one of the most popular tools for
automatized configuration parsing and editing. Augeas has
extensive application coverage with 182 lenses, which are file
parsing rules to generate key-value pairs for different appli-
cations including httpd, MySQL, Nginx, and PostgreSQL.
Augeas has been maintained for more than ten years, has
interfaces in different programming languages including
Python, Ruby, and Java, and used by other configuration
management tools including Puppet [29] and bcfg2 [30].
As Augeas is primarily intended for managing configu-
rations in systems with uniform and known configuration
structure, its output is not ideal for key-value-based statis-
tical analysis and learning in the cloud. The issues with the
Augeas parser output can be seen in the example in Fig. 5.
Augeas produces artificial keys (e.g., /directive[1]) that
do not correspond to parameters but represent the location
and type of the configuration entries. Hence, a specific
Augeas key does not necessarily point to the same param-
eter across different files. For example, in the httpd config-
uration file in Fig. 5, if the first two lines were swapped,
/directive[1] and /directive[2] keys would have
referred to Redirect and Listen, respectively, unlike the
Augeas output in Fig. 5. Because of this ambiguity of Augeas
key-value pairs, directly using Augeas is often ineffective
for corpus-based configuration analysis.
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Fig. 5. Extraction phase. Augeas parses configuration files based on the
labels given by the discovery phase. The key-value pairs generated by
Augeas is converted into a tree that retains the configuration hierarchy,
where texts in parenthesis represent the values of nodes. This tree is
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3.2.2 Disambiguation of the Augeas Output
To prepare Augeas’ output for corpus-based analysis, we
use a disambiguation step and transform Augeas’ output into
key-value pairs where a key consistently corresponds to the
same single parameter across different files. As depicted in
Fig. 5, we convert Augeas’s output into an intermediate tree
that retains configuration hierarchy. We transform this tree
using a list of application-specific rules such that the trans-
formed tree faithfully represents all configuration param-
eters. We manually implement these rules using minimal
domain knowledge and only by examining the document
structure, parameters found in the configuration files, and
their corresponding output produced by Augeas.
Example disambiguation rules: By examining httpd
configuration files and the Augeas output, we observe that
directive keys are redundant, and we extract the actual
parameter names from the values of the directive keys.
The configuration options assigned to these parameters are
extracted from the value of the child node named arg. We
also observe that specific entries such as Redirect rep-
resent configuration commands with multiple arguments.
From a configuration analysis perspective, we are interested
in which arguments are being redirected (/Foo in Fig. 5)
and where they are directed to (/Bar in Fig. 5). In this case,
we use Redirect /Foo as the key, indicating that /Foo
is being redirected, and /Bar as the value assigned to this
key. We identify 15 such configuration commands in httpd
documentations. Our final observation is that nodes without
values (such as IfModule) indicate configuration hierarchy.
These observations can be summarized in the following
transformation rules for httpd:
• directive nodes are replaced by the parameter
names stored in the node’s value. The value of the
new node is the value of the child node named arg.
• For specific keys that represent configuration com-
mands (such as Redirect), the new key is ap-
pended with the value of the child node named
arg[1]. The value of the new node is the concate-
nation of the values of the remaining children whose
name start with arg.
• Nodes without values (such as IfModule) are con-
verted into an intermediate node where their key is
appended with the value of the concatenation of the
values of the children whose name start with arg.
After this rule-based transformation, the disambiguated
tree is flattened and converted into a table as depicted in
Fig. 5. In this table, the entry number represents the ordering
of the values in the configuration file. The application label
and the file path are also appended to this table such
that all configurations extracted from a cloud instance are
represented in a single standardized format for analysis.
To extract reliable key-value pairs from the configura-
tion files of a new application, one needs to implement
tree transformation rules specific to the new application
by examining the configuration file structure, configuration
parameters, and the corresponding Augeas output using
minimal domain knowledge as described above. A new
Augeas lens may be required if the Augeas library does not
support the new application.
3.3 Analysis
The discovery and extraction phases of ConfEx produce
consistent key-value pairs that represent software configura-
tions along with environmental information from the cloud
instances, enabling the use of a rich variety of configuration
analysis and validation techniques in multi-tenant cloud
platforms and image repositories. Analysis of software con-
figurations can be used both to detect misconfigurations
and to gain insight on user configuration practices. Existing
automated misconfiguration detection techniques that can
be applied as part of ConfEx include outlier value detec-
tion [15], parameter type inference [14], [31], rule-based
validation [32], [33], parameter correlation analysis [17],
matching configuration parameters with the parameters in
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Statistics on the studied Docker Hub Images
target
application
# of images that
contain the app.
total # of app.
config. files
httpd 1601 53100
MySQL 2238 9481
Nginx 3714 32343
Network services 6106 6106
Users & Groups 7805 7805
the source code for source-based analysis [34]. We provide
examples of how two of these techniques could be used
during this phase in Sec. 5.
3.4 Implementation
We have implemented our ConfEx framework using Python.
ConfEx crawls cloud instances using IBM’s public agentless
system crawler1 and uses Augeas 1.7 for file parsing. We
have implemented disambiguation rules for httpd, MySQL,
and Nginx applications as well as /etc/services,
/etc/passwd, and /etc/group system configurations.
4 EVALUATION
We evaluate ConfEx using the Docker Hub repository, which
is one of the largest publicly available container image
repositories with over 650,000 registered users [35]. We
focus on the Docker Hub images that are either among the
most downloaded 2000 images or contain one of the three
following popular cloud applications: httpd, MySQL, and
Nginx. For each application, we use the images that are
downloaded at least 50 times and contain the application
name in their name or description. We have manually
labeled the configuration files in these images by examining
file contents and paths of all text files that comply with
the application configuration file syntax. In addition to
application configuration files, we use the following system
configuration files in our evaluation: the network services
file (/etc/services), the users file (/etc/passwd), and
the groups file (/etc/group).
Table 3 summarizes the number of images we use along
with the number of identified configuration files in these
images. In total, we use 7805 images, where 1163 images
contain configuration files of more than one target applica-
tion and 254 images contain configuration file of all three
applications. The largest three configuration files have the
sizes 140KB, 99KB, and 41KB. Hence, we set the file discov-
ery size threshold in the configuration file identification step
(Sec. 3.1.2) to 200KB. Our data set contains a total of over 22
million text files that are smaller than 200KB.
The remainder of this section first discusses our findings
based on our study of the active files in Docker containers.
We then study the impact of Tconfidence on configuration
file discovery, compare ConfEx’s discovery phase with the
baseline approaches, and discuss the overhead of ConfEx.
4.1 Active File Discovery
To identify accessed (i.e., active) files in Docker containers,
ConfEx tracks open() system calls to the container file sys-
tem during application initialization. In our experiments, we
1. https://github.com/cloudviz/agentless-system-crawler
TABLE 4
Statistics on the active configuration files in the selected Docker Hub
images
application # ofimages
# of accessed
files
# of accessed
config. files
httpd 50 2415 (out of 559K) 496 (out of 1768)
MySQL 50 10152 (out of 1.1M) 143 (out of 290)
Nginx 50 5788 (out of 404K) 166 (out of 650)
find that tracking open() calls for ten seconds is sufficient
to capture configuration file accesses of the applications that
are already installed in the images. After ten seconds, we
observe either no more open() calls or periodic calls to
specific non-configuration files.
The arguments used while deploying a Docker container
may affect which configuration files are used by the run-
ning applications. However, most images on Docker Hub
do not contain instructions on their intended deployment
procedure. Hence, we study the active file discovery phase of
ConfEx using a subset of our target images where we use the
necessary commands to correctly initialize the applications.
Table 4 shows statistics on the active files in the selected
Docker Hub images. On average, less than 1% of the exist-
ing files are accessed during application initialization. This
indicates that most Docker images are loaded with extra
files that are not needed by the applications. We find that
while using these publicly available images significantly
reduces development time, these images often contain files
and features that are not needed by the final service, filling
the deployed container with unnecessary files. For example,
the ubuntu:xenial image, which a naı¨ve developer may
use as a base image, contains over 1000 user manual files,
which are not used in automatically deployed containers,
and over 500 files for the perl package, which may not be
needed by the running applications.
Our results in Table 4 also show that only 30% of
the syntactically valid configuration files are used by the
running applications. As discussed in Sec. 2.1, the remain-
ing configuration files consist of configurations of unused
modules and plug-ins, template files, and configuration files
that are used for testing and development purposes rather
than for deployment. Errors detected in these unused files
can be perceived as false positives by cloud users. ConfEx
prevents such false positives by focusing on active files in
VMs and containers. However, for static images, no file
access information is available. Thus, configuration analysis
should be performed on all configuration files in images.
4.2 Configuration File Identification
We measure the effectiveness of configuration file identifica-
tion separately for each application and using five-fold cross
validation. That is, for each application, we randomly divide
the images in our corpus into five equal-sized partitions.
We use the configuration files of the target application in
four of these partitions to train our framework, and all
the text files of the fifth partition as testing set, where we
predict whether the input text files are configuration files
of the target application. We repeat this procedure five
times, where each partition is used as a testing set once.
Furthermore, we repeat the five-fold cross validation five
times with different randomly-selected partitions.
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Fig. 6. Configuration file identification results w.r.t. confidence threshold using only the vocabulary based identification (without syntax check). Recall
remains nearly ideal for all confidence thresholds as configuration files use the same set of commands and parameter names. With a confidence
threshold above 0.5, ConfEx achieves above 0.98 precision for httpd and MySQL even without syntax check.
We use precision and recall as evaluation metrics. Preci-
sion is the fraction of true positives (i.e., correctly identified
configuration files) to the total number of files predicted as
configuration files, and recall is the fraction of true positives
to the total number of configuration files in the testing set.
4.2.1 Selecting the Confidence Threshold
Figure 6 shows the precision and recall ConfEx achieves on
identifying the configuration files with various Tconfidence
levels only using the vocabulary-based identification (i.e.,
without syntax check). Recall remains ideal for all three
applications and all Tconfidence levels. This is because the set
of configuration keywords for a given application is limited;
and hence, the configuration files in the training and testing
sets use the same set keywords. Precision typically increases
with the increasing Tconfidence. With a low Tconfidence, the
input text files with keywords that don’t exist in an appli-
cation vocabulary are labeled as configurations, increasing
false positives. As we show in the next section, nearly all
such false positives are eliminated by checking the syntax of
the selected files. Tconfidence has a higher impact on Nginx’s
precision compared to httpd and MySQL as Nginx uses
configuration keywords that are commonly found in the
configuration files of other applications and system software
(such as user and include). To account for configuration
keywords that may not be observed during training, we set
Tconfidence to 0.9. However, in our dataset, we observe no
difference in the file identification results after syntax check
for Tconfidence between 0.8 and 1.0.
4.2.2 Comparison with Baselines
We implement two baselines using the Augeas configura-
tion editing library [28] to compare ConfEx’s configuration
file identification accuracy with. Our first baseline, default,
uses Augeas’ discovery approach of checking the existence
of files in specific file paths. These paths account for the
default application installation paths in various Linux dis-
tributions. Table 5 shows the paths checked by Augeas
to identify httpd configuration files as an example. Our
second baseline, syntax, attempts to parse all text files using
Augeas, and marks the files that conform with the target
application’s configuration file syntax as configuration files.
Figure 7 compares the precision and recall of the base-
lines and ConfEx on identifying application configuration
files. As all files found in default configuration paths are
TABLE 5
File paths checked by Augeas to identify httpd configuration files.
“*” is a wildcard that represents any file name.
/etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf
/etc/httpd/httpd.conf
/etc/httpd/conf.d/*.conf
/etc/apache2/sites-available/*
/etc/apache2/mods-available/*
/etc/apache2/conf-available/*.conf
/etc/apache2/conf.d/*
/etc/apache2/ports.conf
/etc/apache2/httpd.conf
/etc/apache2/apache2.conf
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Fig. 7. Configuration file identification results. While the default approach
of checking standard file paths misses up to 81% of configuration
files, only checking file syntax leads to low precision by labeling non-
configuration files as configurations. ConfEx ’s file labeling achieves over
99% precision and 100% recall.
indeed application configurations, default achieves ideal pre-
cision. However, default misses 20-81% of configuration files,
leading to low recall. syntax achieves ideal recall as all ap-
plication configuration files conform with the expected file
syntax. However, a significant portion of non-configuration
files are also syntactically valid, leading to low precision. For
httpd and MySQL, where the configuration syntax accepts
key-value pairs with a space delimiter, the precision of
syntax is below 2%. For Nginx, where the configuration
syntax involves the use of semicolons and curly brackets,
the precision still remains below 29%.
By combining the vocabulary-based check and syntactic
validation, ConfEx achieves over 99% precision and ideal
recall for all three applications. The majority of the re-
maining mislabeled files are configuration files of different
applications and have a single configuration command with
a keyword Include or include. These files also have the
9correct syntax and would be accepted as valid configura-
tions by our target applications.
4.3 Computational Overhead
Crawling the contents of an image with ConfEx takes eight
seconds on the average using an Intel Xeon E5-2650 pro-
cessor. During crawling, the contents of all text files that are
smaller than 200KB are compressed and recorded, excluding
the files with extensions that are commonly used for non-
configuration files (such as .h or .css). Note that the con-
tents of an image is crawled before deployment, avoiding
any performance overhead on applications. Identifying con-
figuration files in an image and extracting the information in
these files take 3.5 seconds on the average, where the mean
number of text files per image is above 2800.
The only performance impact on a production system
is incurred during active file discovery. ConfEx uses the
auditd tool to track open() system calls in containers dur-
ing application initialization, which is less than ten seconds
in our experiments. We observe that typically, at most a few
hundred open() calls are issued during this initialization
period, resulting in negligible performance overhead.
5 APPLIED EXAMPLES
ConfEx enables the use of existing key-value-based config-
uration analysis tools in the cloud. To demonstrate this, we
present applied examples of ConfEx for detecting miscon-
figurations using two techniques proposed in prior work:
PeerPressure [15] and Encore [14].
5.1 PeerPressure
PeerPressure [15] is a tool that finds the culprit configuration
entry in a Windows image with a single configuration error.
PeerPressure is designed for Windows registry, where con-
figurations are represented as key-value pairs; and hence,
it is not directly applicable on text-based software configu-
rations found in cloud instances. In this example, we show
how ConfEx and PeerPressure can be used together to detect
misconfigurations in Docker Hub images, and study the im-
pact of ConfEx’s file labeling (Sec. 3.1.2) and disambiguation
(Sec. 3.2.2) steps on the effectiveness of PeerPressure.
PeerPressure has an offline training and an online testing
phase. During training, PeerPressure records the histogram
of values assigned to each key in a trusted configuration
corpus. Given a new image during testing, PeerPressure
compares the values assigned to each key in the image
with the value histograms seen during training. For each
key-value pair, it then calculates the probability of being a
misconfiguration based on empirical Bayesian estimation.
Here, an outlier value has a high probability of being an
error. Finally, the key-value pairs are ranked based on the
calculated probabilities, so that the pairs that are ranked the
highest are the most likely misconfigurations.
We use PeerPressure to detect the application misconfigu-
rations listed in Table 6. We inject each misconfiguration to a
randomly selected image that contains the target parameter
to be misconfigured, and repeat the randomized injection
1000 times. For each injection, we train PeerPressure using
the configuration key-value pairs extracted from all images
TABLE 6
Injected application misconfigurations
application name description
httpd url Error 401 points to a remote URL [36]
httpd dns Unnecessary reverse DNS lookups [37]
httpd path Wrong module path
httpd mem MaxMemFree should be in KB
httpd req Too low request limit per connection
MySQL enum Enumerators should be case-sensitive [16]
MySQL buf Unusually large sort buffer [38]
MySQL limit Too low connection error limit [39]
MySQL max Invalid value for max # of connections
Nginx files Too few open files are allowed per worker
Nginx debug Logging debug outputs to a file [40]
Nginx access Giving access to root directory [41]
Nginx host Using hostname in a listen directive [41]
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Fig. 8. The percentage of injected errors that are ranked within the top
ten suspects by PeerPressure among 1000 randomized injections for
each misconfiguration. Using ConfEx ’s disambiguated key-value pairs
consistently improves PeerPressure’s effectiveness on error detection.
except for the misconfigured image. We then run PeerPres-
sure and record its output ranking for the injected error.
We use two baselines for comparison, where we train
and test PeerPressure using the configuration key-value pairs
provided by the baselines. The first baseline, Augeas, parses
the configuration files located in default paths using Augeas
library, and directly uses Augeas library’s output. The sec-
ond baseline, ConfEx no disambiguation, again uses Augeas
library’s output but parses all application configuration files
in a given image. We use this baseline to focus on the impact
of disambiguation.
5.1.1 PeerPressure Error Detection Results
Figure 8 shows the percentage of injected errors that are
ranked among the top 10 suspects by PeerPressure. Using
ConfEx’s disambiguated output consistently leads to similar
or higher rankings compared to using the key-value pairs
generated by baselines, making it easier to pinpoint the
error. 9 out of 13 errors are ranked within the top 10 suspects
for more than 90% of the injections.
As the Augeas baseline only parses the files located in
standard paths, PeerPressure cannot find an injected error
with this baseline if the error is injected in a file in a non-
standard location. The parameters that are modified in the
url, mem, and limit misconfigurations rarely appear in files
located in standard paths in our corpus; hence, PeerPressure
misses these errors with the Augeas baseline.
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When using the key-value pairs generated by the Con-
fEx no disambiguation baseline, PeerPressure suffers from
having an incorrect view on the distribution of configura-
tions due to the ambiguity in Augeas library’s output as
discussed in Sec. 3.2.1. This problem is exacerbated when
the misconfigured image has files that have substantially
different parameter ordering compared to the files seen in
the corpus. In these images, the parameters are represented
by keys that use uncommon key indexing, making common
configuration entries become outliers in the corpus and have
high PeerPressure rankings.
5.2 Encore
Encore is a recently proposed tool that infers configuration
constraints based on configurations collected from working
systems [14]. In its original implementation, Encore uses
the Augeas library to collect configurations and convert the
collected information into key-value pairs. As we show in
this paper, using Augeas only is not sufficient to discover
configuration files in cloud instances, and the key-value
pairs generated by Augeas are ambiguous, decreasing the
robustness of corpus-based analysis. In this example, we
demonstrate how ConfEx significantly increases the effec-
tiveness of Encore on analyzing configurations in the cloud.
Encore has two steps: Parameter type inference and rule
inference. Parameter type inference focuses on associating
keys with configuration types such as integer, file path, or
IP address. To reduce the amount of generated false types
and rules, Encore focuses only on keys whose value show
a certain level of entropy across the corpus, where entropy
is a measure of diversity. Given a key-value pair, Encore
first checks the syntax of the value to understand the type
of the configuration key. For example, a value is identi-
fied as an IP address if it matches the regular expression
ˆ\d{1,3}(\.\d{1,3}){3}$. Next, Encore performs a type-
specific semantic check to verify the type identification. For
example, if a value is syntactically identified as a file path,
the semantic step checks whether the given file path exists
in the file system. If there is such a file exists, the type of the
corresponding key is inferred as a file path.
In the rule inference step, Encore utilizes association rule
learning to generate configuration constraints using type-
specific rule templates. An example rule template is: “An
entry should be equal to another entry of the same type”.
Such rule templates decrease the search space across the
key-value pairs and reduces false rules. For each rule tem-
plate, Encore generates all possible rules across the training
corpus, then filters the generated rules based on support and
confidence. Support is the fraction of images that have all
the keys used in the proposed rule, and confidence is the
fraction of the images where the rule is valid. Encore accepts
a rule only if its support and confidence are at least 10% and
90%, respectively.
We use the configuration data extracted by ConfEx or
one of the Augeas or ConfEx no disambiguation baselines (see
Sec. 5.1) with Encore to infer configuration parameter types
and configuration value constraints. Then, without injecting
any misconfigurations, we identify the key-value pairs that
violate the inferred parameter types and value constraints.
5.2.1 Encore Error Detection Results
Using the key-value pairs generated by our Con-
fEx framework, Encore detects 184 configuration er-
rors. 181 of these errors are placeholder values that
need to be replaced by external scripts. The val-
ues used in these files include __PROXY_PASS__ and
{{(8*flavor['ram']/512)|int}}M, which would lead
to errors if these files are directly used. Encore also detects
two file path errors where Windows-style paths are used in
the configuration files of Docker Hub images. Another de-
tected error is in the /etc/passwd file of an image, where
the absolute path of a user’s shell is set to ata:ata:at.
When using the ConfEx no discovery baseline, Encore
finds only 99 of these errors due to the ambiguity in the
key-value pairs. Using the Augeas baseline, which ignores
files in non-standard paths both during training and testing,
reduces the number of detected errors to 10.
6 RELATED WORK
Finding and preventing errors is a major focus of the re-
search on software configurations. Execution trace analysis
and binary instrumentation have been shown to provide
insight on the root causes of configuration errors [18], [42].
Due to their intrusiveness, however, instrumentation and
trace analysis are often impractical on production work-
loads. Source code analysis [16], [34], [43] and natural lan-
guage processing on application documentations [20], [44]
have been used to infer configuration constraints before
deployment. Configuration entries that do not comply with
these constraints are then marked as errors.
Runtime-based configuration validation techniques [45],
[46] have been used to check that the runtime behavior of
an application matches an expected behavioral profile based
on a valid configuration. Unexpected behavior is flagged
as a possible misconfiguration. These techniques are largely
application-specific and require either precise configuration
of a monitoring daemon for the kinds of behavior being
observed or modification of the application itself.
Application-agnostic statistical techniques [14], [15], [21]
use previously-observed configurations to learn about the
common patterns, and identify deviations as potential er-
rors. These techniques require key-value pairs that represent
configurations for analysis, and do not address discovery or
extraction for text-based configuration files.
In prior studies, the discovery and extraction of config-
urations in the cloud have been performed using several
methods: parsing known configuration files with custom
scripts (e.g., [20], [47]), crawling erroneous files from mail-
ing lists and technical forums (e.g., [3]), parsing files lo-
cated in default paths using configuration parsing libraries
(e.g., [14]), and using standardized configuration stores such
as the Windows registry (e.g., [15]). In image repositories
and multi-tenant cloud environments, however, configura-
tion file locations are unknown, and configuration parsers
produce key-value pairs that lack the consistency and ro-
bustness required for meaningful statistical analysis.
Existing tools for handling configurations focus on cen-
tralized management rather than extracting key-value pairs
in a cloud environment. Chef [12] and Ansible [13] have con-
figuration editing capabilities that are restricted to search-
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and-replace based on regular expressions, but they cannot
extract configurations from text files. CFEngine [48] can
parse standard file formats such as XML and JSON, but not
application-specific configuration formats such as in httpd
and Nginx. Puppet [29] and bcfg2 [30] can edit application-
specific files by leveraging Augeas library [28]. As we show
in this work, using the Augeas library alone is not sufficient
for parameter extraction for robust configuration analysis.
Recently, Huang et al. proposed SAIC [49], a tool to
help users discover text-based configuration files in cloud
instances with unlabeled content. To identify configuration
files, SAIC analyzes the change patterns of files over the
lifetime of a cloud instance. Hence, SAIC is only applicable
to cloud instances that have multiple versions where the
configuration file locations remain the same and configu-
rations are modified. Xu et al. [50] have discussed the op-
portunities and challenges associated with mining container
image repositories for software configurations, but have not
devised a solution.
We have introduced a preliminary version of ConfEx
in our recent work [51]. As opposed to this preliminary
version, our framework in this paper has an active file dis-
covery methodology, applies syntax check while identifying
configuration files in addition to the vocabulary-based com-
parison, and records the order of parameters that appear in
a configuration file as well as environmental configuration
information. These improvements enable the detection of
a wider set of misconfigurations. In addition to the above
improvements, in this extended paper, we present a more
detailed evaluation of ConfEx by using both PeerPressure and
Encore as applied examples.
To the best of our knowledge, our configuration analytics
framework, ConfEx, is the first to systematically discover
and extract text-based software configurations in cloud in-
stances with unlabeled content. In this way, ConfEx enables
comprehensive analysis of software configurations in the
cloud to help users validate their configurations and achieve
robust operation.
7 CONCLUSION
Due to the increasing prevalence and severity of misconfig-
urations in cloud services, there is need for a cloud-based
framework that can support analyzation and validation of
software configurations. To enable automated configuration
analysis, we have proposed ConfEx, a framework to discover
and analyze text-based software configurations in multi-
tenant cloud platforms. To identify configuration files in
cloud instances with unlabeled content, ConfEx keeps track
of configuration keywords such as parameter names and
commands in text files and checks file syntax, achieving
over 99% precision and 100% recall. To parse these files,
ConfEx leverages a community-driven configuration parser,
Augeas. It then disambiguates the parser output to obtain
configuration key-value pairs that are consistent across dif-
ferent files and cloud instances. Our framework enables
the use of existing configuration analysis tools, which are
designed for key-value pairs, in the cloud, which we hope
will lead to fewer configuration-related outages and a more
secure and reliable cloud ecosystem.
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